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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
recent case, Nealis v. Industrial Bank of Commerce, 200 Misc.
406, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1951), an attorney recovered
$100 damages in libel and nondnal damages in negligence for the
wrongful refusal to honor a valid check. If the plaintiff elects to
sue in contract, evidence of injury to his credit is admissible at
the trial. Levine v. State Bank, 80 Misc. 524, 141 N. Y. Supp. 596
(Sup. Ct. 1913).
A bank may be liable beyond the limits of a contract where
it fails to lend money, Goldsmith v. Holland Trust Co., 5 App. Div.
104, 38 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (1st Dep't 1896), or fails to renew notes,
Bank of Commerce v. Bright, 77 Fed. 949 (3d Cir. 1896). But, the
specific hazard must have been in contemplation at the time the
contract was made. McCoRMiCK, DAmAGES § 139 (1935).
In the instant case the minority is shocked that a bank can
cause foreseeable gross harm to a depositor, and escape liability.
It argues that credit standing is a protected interest, and that an
attempt at proof of foreseeable injury caused by the negligent
payment should not be denied the plaintiff. But even under the
rationale of the New York wrongful-refusal-to-pay cases more
than nominal damages beyond the amounts of the checks would
be denied. Also, it would appear that in accord with Levine v.
State Bank, supra, proof of injury to credit standing would still
be admissible at the trial of the contract action.
To the writer the holding of the majority is sound. Although
consequential tort damages are commonplace in other areas, the
door should not be opened to impose additional liability on banks
for the results of their errors. Since the banks must assume the
losses on forged checks, tort damages would place their standard
of responsibility completely out of proportion to that in other
commercial and professional areas.
David Abbott
CHILDREN'S COURT ACT-MEDICAL TREATMENT
OF CHILD AGAINST PARENT'S WISHES
Proceeding by Commissioner of Social Welfare to obtain
custody of twelve year old boy whose father, because of personal
philosophy, refused to allow an operation on son's hairlip and
cleft palate. Held (3-2): Children's Court should have ordered
medical and surgical care. In re Seiferth, 285 App. Div. 221, 137
N. Y. S. 2d 35 (4th Dep't 1955).
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RECENT DECISIONS
"It is the public policy of the state of New York to provide
medical services for the rehabilitation of physically handicapped
children." N.Y. PuBLiC HEALTH LAW § 2580. A physically handi-
capped child is one who, by reason of a physical defect, is inca-
pacitated for education or for remunerative occupation. N. Y.
CuRnD1N's CouRT ACT § 2(7). The Children's Court Act of New
York confers on Children's Court jurisdiction of physically handi-
capped and neglected children. A neglected child is one whose
parents refuse to provide necessary medical or surgical care.
N. Y. CHEimENx's CoURT ACT § 2(4).
Assuming that all constitutional questions were settled, there
might still be one consideration which would preclude an order
for the operation, viz., that the child is twelve years old, and has
adopted the same ideas about this operation as his father.
The lower court ordered only that the child be acquainted with
the benefits of the operation, and be permitted to decide for him-
self. In re Seiferth, 127 N. Y. S. 2d 63 (Children's Ct. 1954).
None of the cases previous to this have had to deal with such
a problem. The adverse psychological impact on this child may
outweigh the physical benefits. It has been said, in awarding cus-
tody to someone else upon father's refusal to supply medical aid,
that "when a court is asked to appoint a guardian . . ., it will
investigate the circumstances and act according to sound discre-
tion, the primary object being the good of the child." Heineman's
Appeal, 96 Pa. St. 112 (1880). Section 24 of the New York Chil-
dren's Court Act provides that "the court in its discretion .
may cause any person within its jurisdiction to be examined" and
"whenever a child within the jurisdiction of the court and under
the provisions of this act appears to the court to be in need of
medical or surgical care . . ., a suitable order may be made for
the treatment . . . of such child . . .. " [Emphasis added.] Cases
have held that, where the treatment sought would be of dubious
benefit or would involve substantial risk to the child, the courts
would not intervene against the parents' wishes, even where the
child himself desired the operation. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d
673, 126 P. 2d 765 (1942). In view of the discretion allowed thejudge of the Children's Court and the policy of the state to serve
the child's best interests, as evidenced by statute and cases, the
instant decision would seem to contravene both. Here there was no
expert medical testimony as to the psychological effect on the child,
but it was the contention of the father and the belief of the judge
that provision should be made for his mental welfare.
To order medical treatment the court need not find it "neces-
sary" to the life of the child. It need only be that "the health,
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the limb, the person, or the future of the child is at stake." In re
Rotkowitz, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 624, (N. Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941). And it
has long been settled that medical treatment can be ordered over
the objections of the parents. In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128,
263 N. Y. S. 552 (2d Dep't 1933).
As parens patriae, the state can do what it thinks is for the
best interests of the child. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429, 148
N. E. 624 (1925).
This was all admitted for purposes of the above argument.
The appellate court never reached the problem set out, except to
say that it disagreed with the lower court.
The constitutional objection to state interference with reli-
gious convictions is dismissed by the appellate court by calling
these convictions "arbitrary" objections to the operation. As a
general rule, religious convictions must fall before the needs of
public health under the police power. People v. Labrenz, 411 Ill.
618, 104 N. E. 2d 769 (1952) ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S.
11, (1905); Buck v. BeZl, 274 U. S. 200 (1927). But unlike the
vaccination and sterilization cases, where the benefits to public
health were apparent, cases like the instant one are not of such
obvious benefit, and the United States Supreme Court has never
passed on the constitutionality of such orders. State courts jus-
tify them by the claim of parens patriae, and by the fact that "Ia
democratic society rests for its continuance upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as'citizens, with
all that it implies." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 168
(1944). Here the court, in holding constitutional the state law
prohibiting and maling unlawful the furnishing to a minor any
article to sell in violation of state law, said "We neither lay the
foundation 'for any (that is, every) state intervention in the
indoctrination and participation of children in religion' which
may be done 'in the name of their health and welfare' nor give
warrant for ' every limitation on their religious training and activ-
ities'." 321 U. S. at 171.
The jurisdiction of the state at parens patriae and as wielder
of the police power has probably never extended so far as in the
Seiferth case. Although the wisdom of such an extension is doubt-
ful, the New York Court of Appeals will probably affirm in light
of other state court decisions.
Dawn Girard
